By Kam Sandhu – @KamBass
 
With calls for Work & Pensions Minister Iain Duncan Smith to resign from his post over benefit related deaths and his apprehension to release these figures, we look at IDSlegacy on welfare over the last few years.
 
IDS’ policies have been a disaster even on their own stated terms – including soaring costs to the taxpayer, hindering employment and harming the economy. Add to this the hardship and negligence cast upon those trying to navigate the welfare system during this time, and we are left with a gravity of damage that will take years to repair and relieve.
 
In this series, we will look at the deliberate misuse of statistics, workfare, the work programme, sanctions, use of threats and targets, and much more. In the first part, we turn to the implementation of IDS’ flagship Universal Credit scheme…
 
UC

Universal Credit was launched in 2013. The promise for a £2.4bn overhaul was a simpler benefits system combining six means-tested benefits into one monthly payment. Conservatives said that by 2023, it would save £7bn a year, and reduce fraud at the same time.

But it wasn’t long before the very foundations of the system were being questioned when in June of 2013, the DWP decided to reveal that the actual cost of the system ‘over it’s lifetime’ of implementation would be 6 times the original amount put before Parliament in 2010; £12.8bn.

The original figure of around £2bn had been repeated by Minister of Justice, Chris Grayling and ex-Employment Minister, Mark Hoban, as late as 2012.

The DWP insisted the increased figure did not take into account other savings that would come while the system was implemented and was only because there had to be two systems running at the same time. Still, the DWP refused to break down the figure further.   Yet, in a climate of punishing measures on welfare claimants in the name of saving money, the DWP refused to explain and break down why over £10bn was needed, insisting it was necessary for the sole use of Universal Credit.

By August 2013, leaked staff surveys showed the chaos existed in all departments, with staff feeling frustrated, leaderless and confused.  One member of staff said the work was “soul-destroying.”

This was confirmed when in September of that same year a National Audit Office report found “the programme suffered from weak management, ineffective control and poor governance,” and “has not achieved value for money.” Of the £303m spent on IT by then, £34m was written off, and the system STILL had “limited functionality” and was unable to identify fraudulent claims.

The report said that the overhaul had started before Ministers knew how the project would actually work. Secretaries were able to sign off purchase orders worth more than £20m, where in some cases it was unclear what for. Labour highlighted that the Department was covering up failures that could lead to putting welfare claimants at risk. At the same time, the development team had adopted a ‘fortress culture’ whereby only positive news of progress was released. IDS seemed to want to prove this right when speaking to the BBC after the report:

“This is not an IT disaster, this will be delivered in time and on budget…I am not and will not be spending a penny more than we originally planned. I hope and believe that with the way that we’ve changed this, we will actually be more efficient in delivering this and save the taxpayer further money.”

To top off the year, IDS blamed the problems of Universal credit on the staff, and was accused of misleading Parliament when stating to the Public Accounts Committee  that £40m had to be written off under the scheme to IT so far. The true figure, conveniently surfacing after Iain Duncan Smith was answering in person, was 4 times this; £161m.

IDS had planned for 1million people to be using the system by April 2014. In October 2013, just 6 months prior, less than 3,000 people were signed up, costing over £200k per person enrolled.  The revised date for rollout became 2017, but Iain Duncan Smith was still fighting tribunals to keep the failures of Universal Credit from the public, despite numerous rulings demanding their release. The Department for Work and Pensions refused to release the following (highlighted by Politics.co.uk):

  • “The risk register: This is a record and evaluation of possible risks to the development and operation of the universal credit scheme and the “gravity” of those risks.

  • The issues register: This is a continuing record of problems within the programme, why they have occurred and how they can be dealt with.

  • A milestone schedule: This sets out the planned progression of the programme and the dates by which elements should be completed.

  • A project assessment review: This is an assessment of independent reviews taken of the project under the auspices of the cabinet office.

The DWP insist the release of these documents would have “a chilling effect” on the workings of the department.

However, an information tribunal ruling published earlier this year found no evidence of this and insisted that: “we are not persuaded that disclosure would have a chilling effect in relation to the documents before us.”

The Major Project’s Authority (MPA), designed to oversee implementations of public services and schemes, released their annual report in May 2014 containing the failures and successes of government flagship schemes such as HS2 and Universal Credit.The schemes are graded on a green, amber, red rating. The MPA’s red rating deems the scheme “unachievable within reasonable timescales and to a reasonable budget without urgent remedial action.” But Universal Credit, had been given a “meaningless” ‘reset’ rating.

The Universal Credit scheme had been given a red rating by the MPA but this had been changed due to protestations from the Minister for Work and Pensions and his DWP department. This rendered the entire purpose of the MPA as an overseer of projects that cost us billions, completely worthless. Such is the power and desperation of our Work and Pensions Minister, that covering his catastrophes with linguistic guises has become somewhat of a trope for him.

In June 2014, IDS was called before the Public Accounts Committee who called the overhaul a ‘fiasco’:

“This resulted in significant delays, a backlog of claims and unnecessary distress for claimants who have been unable to access the support they need to live, and in some cases work, independently,” said PAC chair Margaret Hodge.

“The personal stories we heard were shocking. We heard evidence of a claimant requiring hospital intervention as a result of the stress caused by the delays suffered, and another claimant who was unable to afford the specific diet required for diabetes and gastric problems while waiting for a decision.”

The cost of Universal Credit was then with-held prior to the election 2015. Pretty strange for a flagship overhaul, which is ‘on time and on budget’.

Within days of the Conservative majority taking hold, it was revealed the Universal Credit system will cost an extra £3bn and will take 9 years to roll out. Labour’s shadow Work and Pensions Secretary, Stephen Timms said:

“Universal Credit costs have risen by £3billion despite only 65,000 people claiming Universal Credit. It will take 495 years to fully roll out Universal Credit at the current rate.”

The new MPA report has also stated that ‘“successful delivery of the project is in doubt, with major risks or issues apparent in a number of key areas.”

Not that you could see it coming.