The first Filton trial began in November last year against six Palestine Action activists who had been held on remand for 15 months after taking action against the Elbit Systems’ flagship Research and Development facility at Filton near Bristol in August 2024. After breaching security fences and driving into the shutter to a loading bay in a second-hand prison van, they managed to decommission around 40 drones believed to be destined for use by the IDF in the Gazan genocide.
Their action took place a year before the group was proscribed under controversial terrorism powers, but although they were never charged with any terrorist offences, four of them recently received long prison sentences in a retrial after a ‘terrorism connection’ was applied during sentencing.
When the jury returned guilty verdicts against the four at the beginning of May, they were not told the sentencing would add this serious element – effectively the activists were found guilty of one charge and yet sentenced under another. This was the latest in a worrying trend of jurors being kept in the dark throughout the prosecution of this case – all of it apparently lawful.
As early as March 2025, months ahead of the first trial, the judge, Mr. Justice Johnson, placed reporting restrictions on his decision that the charges had a ‘terrorist connection’.
He secretly ruled in July 2025 that the defence disclosure requests (to ascertain whether Elbit’s business complied with international and domestic law) were not relevant to the case, as he had ruled out any available lawful defences, including:
- necessity and defence of others at common law,
- prevention of crime under section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967,
- lawful excuse based on consent and the protection of property under section 5(2)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
This ruling was also under strict reporting restrictions.
The decision led to further rulings by the judge which severely constrained the ability of defence counsel to mount any meaningful argument on behalf of their clients. Again, under strict conditions keeping them out of sight of the public, Jeremy Johnson set new rules banning any mention of the history of the Middle East, any evidence tying Elbit Systems to the supply of weapons to Israel, and any reference to genocide. Seemingly determined to cut off any possible remaining way for a jury to find in the defendants’ favour, Johnson also banned the jury from knowing that a judge “may not direct the jury to convict”, nor to know about their inalienable right “to reach a verdict according to their conviction” (a principle known as ‘jury equity’).
A horrified defence team did what they could for their clients, in a trial tainted by unreliable prosecution witnesses, missing CCTV footage that could potentially have shown security guards committing criminal acts, and a complete lack of any itemised financial damage.
On Thursday 8th January, Rajiv Menon KC gave his closing speech on behalf of his client Charlotte Head. Real Media exclusively reported it as part of our extensive coverage of the trial, and it was duly picked up by independent, corporate and state media. Former British Ambassador Craig Murray described it at the time as “one of the greatest legal speeches – including historical speeches – I have ever read…precisely what lawyers need to be doing to resist galloping authoritarianism“.
At the conclusion of Rajiv’s statement that day, the judge invited the Crown prosecution barrister Deanna Heer KC to make comment on whether the speech amounted to contempt of court.
Mr Menon expressed surprise and told the court that he had been extremely careful to adhere to all the restrictions that Mr Johnson had placed, and had worked closely with other senior barristers to ensure that that was the case.
During the rest of that trial, it was decided that any prejudice could be dealt with by what turned out to be quite mild directions to the jury, and no further action was taken at that point.
After the jury returned a set of acquittals or undecided (‘hung’) votes, the prosecution took to social media to announce there would be a retrial, and ahead of that Mr Johnson sent papers to the Administrative Court for them to consider what if any action should be taken over the alleged contempt. They initiated contempt proceedings, but their jurisdiction was challenged last month by a successful appeal. (Full ruling here).
Some media reports suggested that Judge Johnson apologised to Mr Menon for bringing the case – actually he apologised only for employing the wrong procedure and prolonging the issue.
The chair of the Bar Council, Kirsty Brimelow KC, issued a public plea for this to be the end of the matter, but after sending the four Palestine Action activists away to prison this month with sentences totalling 32 years, Mr Justice Johnson is still hounding their lead barrister and he summoned Mr Menon to the High Court on Friday.
Johnson heard new submissions from Tom Little KC, counsel for the CPS, and from Adrian Waterman KC acting for Mr Menon.
The defence first argued that the CPS had no standing in the case according to Criminal Procedure rules, other than if the court or the Attorney General had appointed them as an ‘advocate’ to guide the court. In this instance, they were there in a prosecutorial role and had no jurisdiction to do so. Mr Waterman pointed out there was no evidence that Judge Johnson had actually instigated contempt proceedings during the Filton trial, and instead had invited the Crown to do so.
In an immediate oral ruling before proceeding, Judge Johnson said that after the Court of Appeal had dismissed the case on procedural grounds, they had left the matter back to him. He had invited submissions and listed the matter to be heard AFTER the Filton sentencing, which happened last week. He considered that the CPS was a party to the proceedings when the contempt occurred, have a proper interest now, and he could see no reason the Crown can’t make submissions in these continuing proceedings.
Moving onto the substance of this case, Mr Waterman argued that a barrister should have wide leeway to defend the interests of their client, with the engagement of Article 10 rights, and that any interference with this right should be proscribed by law, and be proportionate. Any restriction on an advocate might have a chilling effect, impinging on Article 6 rights to a fair trial. Thus, any contempt by an advocate must have a high degree of intent, be at the extreme end, constitute grave public interest, and wilfully disregard the authority of the court.
A transcript from the trial showed that, after the CPS suggested that contempt proceedings might be instigated, Mr Menon expressed amazement, pointing out that he had never used the words ‘jury equity’ nor ‘conscience’ and that the Crown’s submission was ‘beyond the pale’. He described hours of lengthy discussions with the other defendants’ counsel, and that he couldn’t understand how he had breached any of the judge’s directions and had certainly not intended to do so.
Mr Waterman proposed that any attempt to follow through contempt proceedings would require a court or tribunal to find that Menon was being wholly untruthful, and that at this stage Judge Johnson should make a ‘threshold’ decision as to whether there was any realistic prospect of this outcome. He argued that this threshold was not reached.
The hearing continued after lunch with Mr Waterman arguing that contempt proceedings should have been instigated at the time of the offence by the judge. He turned to numerous precedents relating to ‘urgency’, arguing that a judge can only act when it is ‘necessary there and then’. What actually happened was that the CPS barrister Ms Heer was the person who made allegations of contempt and the judge had decided to deal with the matter via some mild directions to the jury. The court can of course defer further inquiry, but it MUST instigate that as a matter of urgency at that time, and it hadn’t.
Turning to the matter of jury equity in general, Waterman acknowledged there is a ‘delicate tension’ in law around the subject. I.e. that a jury DOES have the right to give a verdict on their conscience, but they mustn’t be told about it. He argued that any vague or passing reference in court to this is already in a slightly grey area and should not be subject to an allegation of serious contempt.
Nearing the end of his submissions, Waterman turned to the matter of public interest, pointing out that Mr Menon is a very conscientious man, clearly not trying to trample over the judicial system, and if this wasn’t a flagrantly intentional act, then there is no ‘public interest test’ met in proceeding with criminal charges.
He also warned of the serious chilling effect on the legal profession, citing Kirsty Brimelow’s comments (see above).
The judge asked for observations around the merits or otherwise of referring directly to a presiding judge, or referring to the Attorney General. After some discussion of the potential forward process, the defence strongly argued that an Attorney General reference would afford the most fair and appropriate route if Mr Johnson was committed to acting on the issue.
Yesterday Judge Johnson gave his ruling following that hearing, and he has decided again to proceed, apparently unconcerned by any ramifications of a chilling effect on the ability of lawyers to defend their clients, especially in protest-related trials. He has ruled that the matter will now go before a ‘Presiding Judge’, who will consider the matter and decide whether to instigate contempt proceedings against Mr Menon.
On the face of it, this flies against the idea that judges are only given contempt powers on the basis that they are used judiciously, sparingly and proportionately only to confront serious prejudice to the ability of a court to conduct a fair trial. We can only hope that the appointed judge sees the dangers inherent in starting proceedings several months after the event in a quasi-legal procedure that goes well beyond the bounds of what contempt laws were designed to address.
